Failure or flexibility? Apprenticeship training in premodern Europe by Schalk, Ruben et al.
  
Ruben Schalk, Patrick Wallis, Clare Crowston, and  
Claire Lemercier 
Failure or flexibility? Apprenticeship 
training in premodern Europe 
 
Article (Accepted version) 
(Refereed) 
 
 
 Original citation: 
Schalk, Ruben and Wallis, Patrick and Crowston, Clare and Lemercier, Claire (2017) Failure or 
flexibility? Apprenticeship training in premodern Europe. The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 
48 (2). pp. 131-158. ISSN 0022-1953 
 
DOI: 10.1162/JINH_a_01123 
 
© 2017 Massachusetts Institute of Technology and The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/84555/ 
 
Available in LSE Research Online: October 2017 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be 
differences between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the 
publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
 
 
1 
Failure or flexibility? Exits from apprenticeship 
training in pre-modern Europe 
Ruben Schalk (corresponding author), Patrick Wallis, Clare Crowston, and 
Claire Lemercier1 
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Abstract 
Preindustrial apprenticeship is often considered more stable than its nineteenth- and twentieth 
century counterparts, apparently because of the more durable relationships between masters 
and apprentices. Nevertheless, recent studies have suggested that many of those who started 
apprenticeships did not finish them. This paper examines how often individuals who had 
begun the process of qualification for skilled work failed to complete it, and how many 
conversely achieved local mastership. We provide new evidence on the completion of over 
7,000 contracts across several cities in three countries. Even though apprenticeship regulation 
varied, in all cases a substantial minority of youths entering apprenticeship contracts failed to 
complete them. We consider the nature, frequency and causation of these failures. At least 
some exits reflect the balance of opportunities that youths faced, while obtaining mastership 
was affected by local and kin ties. By allowing premature exits, cities and guilds sustained 
labour markets by lowering the risks of entering long training contracts. Training flexibility 
was a pragmatic response to labour market tensions. 
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In the late nineteenth century, France, the UK and many other Western countries faced a 
“crisis in apprenticeship” that many believed was caused by the “greed” of apprentices 
quitting their contracts to earn wages and the venality of masters who exploited rather than 
trained youths. Today, even in Switzerland, Germany and Australia, countries where 
apprenticeship remains important, researchers and politicians worry about high levels of 
premature terminations. Quits affect 20 to 25 percent of contracts, rising to 40 percent in 
some industries. Relative outsiders, such as the children of poor families or immigrants, face 
bleaker prospects than youths with connections, but to many commentators all youths face 
too great a risk that their apprenticeship will end in ‘failure’.2 
Those commenting on the challenges that beset contemporary apprenticeship 
sometimes draw a more or less explicit comparison between its instability and an early-
modern ‘golden age’ when apprenticeship was a stronger, if not necessarily social inclusive, 
institution. In their textbook on the economics of apprenticeship, for example, Smits and 
Stromback summarize a clear picture of pre-industrial apprenticeship, with fixed duration, 
restrictions on unilateral termination, and strong incentives to enforce those provisions – 
incentives primarily provided by guilds and the legal system. These ideas have influenced 
political debates on how to support apprenticeship. In 2010, the UK’s Minister for Skills 
Michael Hayes even called for a rebirth of guilds to help restore the status of apprenticeship. 
Just over a century earlier, another Member of Parliament, Richard Denman, had lamented 
that the ‘collapse of the gilds’ destroyed an ‘efficient system of technical training’ in which 
the ‘conditions of employment were .. minutely regulated’.3  
The image of early-modern apprenticeship that is present in these discussions is 
rooted in the scholarly literature. A number of economic historians have emphasized the 
sturdiness of early modern apprenticeships. Social historians analysing how the young were 
socialized through apprenticeship have similarly imagined them embedded in durable 
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relationships with their master, with breakdowns often implying a household crisis. 
Denman’s comments accompanied the first serious academic book on English apprenticeship. 
However, few studies have provided a longitudinal view of early-modern apprenticeship that 
would allow us to evaluate the frequency of quits or the likelihood of successfully reaching 
mastership directly. In fact, several of the handful of longitudinal studies that have recently 
appeared have found surprisingly high levels of early terminations. Studies identifying the 
large shortfall between the number of new masters and the numbers of new apprentices also 
give us cause to suspect that apprenticeship may not always have been particularly durable, 
although they usually cannot tell us why youths did not become masters, or when they 
stepped off the path towards mastership.4 
In this paper, we examine the trajectories that youths followed from the beginning of 
their apprenticeship to mastership in four early-modern cities, Lyon, Amsterdam, Leiden and 
Shrewsbury, with diverse economic contexts and institutional settings. We focus on two key 
stages: the completion of apprenticeship contracts and entry to mastership. We consider how 
many youths left apprenticeship early, and (for some) when this occurred. What kinds of 
youth tended to stay, and, in particular, how much did social capital influence the outcomes 
of training? And finally, how many, and which, youths would eventually reach full 
membership of their guild by becoming a master?   
These questions about the operation of apprenticeship connect to two wider debates in 
economic and social history. First, they offer us another way to assess the openness of pre-
modern labour markets and the nature of skill formation and labour mobility more 
specifically. By comparing locations with quite different guild systems we are able to 
evaluate the prominent role guilds have played so far in narratives of early modern 
apprenticeship and assess the ways in which social capital distorted or sustained labour 
markets. Second, by uncovering the scale of mobility and the factors that influenced 
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movement, we are able to examine the stability of households and firms within what 
remained a highly patriarchal economic and social system. While a rich body of work has 
explored the conflicts and fragmentation that could occur within premodern workshops, 
quantitative evidence that allows us to consider the frequency of different outcomes is 
extremely scarce, especially if we go beyond the likely minority of conflicts that were 
discussed in courts. We thus offer novel ways to explore the tension between the image of 
households characterized by paternal socialisation aimed at compliance and subordination, 
and that of apprenticeship as a business-like agreement trading work for technical knowledge 
– with apprentices leaving if training was underprovided.5 
 
APPRENTICESHIP IN SHREWSBURY, LYON AND THE NETHERLANDS 
 
If we look at the structure of early-modern apprenticeship, we can see a number of good 
reasons to expect that it was a well-enforced institution. Starting an apprenticeship was 
costly, especially for migrants. Training was not easily available to all. Local ties could be 
needed to find a master, who might demand a fee (premium) for entry. Guilds or cities often 
limited the number of apprentices per master, defined entry requirements based on gender, 
faith, or other criteria, and extracted registration fees. Many apprenticeship contracts included 
local guarantors, and in France some contracts specified damages for exit. Quitting might 
scar a youth’s reputation. Terminating contracts thus looks more costly in the early modern 
period than it does today. On the other hand, completion entitled youths to access privileged 
parts of the labour markets with higher wages. Many cities and towns restricted the right to 
operate independently to masters, and the right to work in a skilled occupation to 
journeymen: an apprenticeship was often necessary to acquire either status (although 
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sometimes masters’ sons had an exemption). In principle, those youths with the good fortune 
to find a master had a strong incentive to complete their apprenticeships.6 
That said, several recent studies that have presented quantitative evidence about 
persistence within apprenticeship have shown high rates of early exit. Around 40 percent of 
apprentices in London and Bristol in the 1690s left their master before their terms finished; 
Dutch orphan apprentices in the eighteenth century frequently moved between masters and 
crafts; more than half of the apprentices at the charity Albergo di Virtù in late eighteenth-
century Turin left early, as did a quarter to a third of charity orphans in Lyon in the same 
period; in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Vienna, termination rates mostly ranged around 
30%, depending on occupation and gender, and reached 57% among locksmiths. Moreover, 
urban courts in London facilitated the cancellation of apprenticeship contracts: a mechanisms 
that we might expect to have tightened contracts actually made them flexible. Those studies 
suggest that the viability of apprenticeship was not undermined by premature terminations. 
Yet not all places saw the same levels of exits: the scattered numbers on exits available for 
early modern Germany are generally lower (12 percent or less); in Göttingen in the mid-
nineteenth century, over 95 percent of carpenter and cabinet maker’s apprentices completed 
their apprenticeships. Moreover, several of the most detailed studies are for places or groups 
that are, potentially, exceptional in nature: large, economically dynamic cities (Bristol; 
London; Vienna); orphans and charity recipients; areas with ‘weak’ guilds (England; 
Netherlands).7  
Here we address these limits by examining exits from apprenticeship in both small 
towns and large cities, some of which were economically stagnant, and some governed by 
strong guilds. In addition, we follow at least some of the apprentices over several moments in 
their contracts and lives. This allows us to consider the impact of social differences on exits. 
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We explore apprenticeship in nine guilds in four cities across three countries. First, 
Shrewsbury, a small English city (c.10,000 population in 1700) distinguished by strong 
guilds (even in 1835 they remained ‘a serious detriment’, judged Parliamentary 
commissioners) and slow growth. Second, Lyon, a large and expanding city (c. 150,000 
population in 1780) thriving through its dominance of silk-weaving - in 1784, the city’s 
14,000 looms were double the number present in the rest of France. Lyon’s industry was 
intensely regulated by the silk guild, the Grande fabrique. Finally, Leiden and Amsterdam in 
the Netherlands both stagnated economically in the eighteenth century, although 
Amsterdam’s size (c. 200,000 population in 1680 and 1795) and commercial strength allowed 
it to avoid Leiden’s decline as a textile centre, visible in its fall from c. 56,000 to c. 31,000 
population between 1700 and 1795. Both cities possessed guilds. Collectively, we have 
information on the completion of more than 7,000 apprenticeship contracts in these locations 
(Table 1). Ideally, of course, we would wish to include evidence on other regions, particularly 
Germany, Italy and Spain, and periods. Nonetheless, our case studies substantially extend the 
scope of existing research.8 
 
<Insert Table 1 near here> 
 
Apprenticeship varied in some respects across these cities. In Shrewsbury, terms 
lasted a minimum of seven years, compared to five years for Lyonnaise silk weavers and the 
Leiden surgeons, three years for Amsterdam pastry bakers and just two for Leiden’s pig 
butchers. Limits on the numbers of apprentices differed – in Lyon, just one was allowed. But 
crucially, all required apprentices to finish the minimum term before they could legitimately 
work as a journeyman or become a master. Evidence on the persistence of apprentices within 
their contracts is extremely scarce. The completion of an apprenticeship is rarely observable, 
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unlike admission as a guild master. Due to the institutional diversity of Europe’s guilds and 
cities, different types of record survive from different settings. Here, we employ three 
different types of source and methodology to observe exits from apprenticeship and follow 
apprentices over time. One or another of these methods are likely to be replicable elsewhere. 
Evidence on apprenticeship in Shrewsbury dates from the 1690s, when a tax on births, 
marriages and deaths led the city to list the members of 2,170 households in the city, 
including their servants and lodgers. We matched the householders in the tax register (by 
forename, surname and occupation) to the masters of a sample of 336 apprentices registered 
by five guilds (the Glovers, Mercers, Smiths, Tailors and Weavers) between 1681 and 1699. 
We successfully identified 66 percent of masters (124 of 188) in the core period of 1688-
1695 with a high degree of confidence. We identified if apprentices lived with their masters, 
and take co-residence as a proxy for the persistence of apprenticeship. The key justification 
for this proxy is that co-residence was normal in apprenticeship, with board and lodging 
forming a key part of nearly all masters’ responsibilities. As we discuss below, absence 
sometimes could be temporary, including assignments with other employers; additionally, 
some absent apprentices were dead. However, many, perhaps most, absences indicate the end 
of a contractual relationship.9 
For Lyon, we analyse three guild registers from the late 1680s to the late 1760s that 
contain information on exits alongside the registration record of 5,281 apprentices. 
Unusually, the Grande fabrique obsessively recorded disruptions to contracts, presumably 
because they risked allowing a master to exceed their quota of apprentices, by scribbling a 
cramped note in the margin beside the original registration. Apprentice registration was 
rigorously maintained: 69 percent of contracts were registered within a week, and 92 percent 
within one month. Yet the result was not strong contracts, but a formal record of when 
apprentices and masters abandoned them.10  
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The registers inform us about three types of disruption: cancellations, interruptions, 
and transfers of apprentices to other masters. The guild’s officers and clerks were not entirely 
consistent. In the 1680s, the register distinguishes between cancellations because the 
apprentice abandoned the trade (‘desistement’) and those on the order of the consuls (a 
municipal court). The former appear more consensual, whereas the latter involved a formal 
procedure requiring one month of absence by the apprentice, a bailiff summoning him to 
return, and a final decision by the consuls. These details are missing later. From the 1740s, 
however, we do have records of interruptions and resumptions in contracts. Throughout, we 
observe the share of apprentices whose contract was formally cancelled. The language the 
clerks used for this was telling: the contract was scratched out (‘rayé par ordre’). This 
formality was essential for the master if he was to take on a new apprentice.11 
In Leiden and Amsterdam, we use guild records of whether an apprentice finished his 
required minimum term: notes kept by guild officials of which apprentices had received the 
leerbrief (‘letter of learning’) that certified this fact. New journeymen were often required to 
show leerbrieven when taking up a position, especially in a new city. This is the most direct 
measure of completion that we possess, giving a positive record of completion rather than a 
negative record of exit or absence. However, it is rarely available. In most cases, letters were 
written privately by apprentices’ masters (many apprenticeship contracts were also privately 
conducted). Only a tiny minority of guilds listed them. Leerbrief registration was found for 
the Amsterdam pig butchers’ guild, the Amsterdam pastry bakers’ guild, and the Leiden 
surgeons’ guild. Guilds charged fees for the leerbrief, but these were not large sums that 
might significantly discourage apprentices from obtaining such an important certificate.12 
 
TERMINATING CONTRACTS: FREQUENT CANCELLATIONS, FREQUENT 
TRANSFERS 
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Our sources do not provide identical information on apprentices’ exits. Nevertheless, all do 
allow us to estimate the share of apprentices who did not complete their terms (Table 2). 
These varied. In Shrewsbury, around forty percent of apprentices disappeared from their 
masters’ household before the end of the seventh and final year of their contracts. In Lyon, 
eighteen percent of contracts were cancelled. Another 1.2 percent of apprentices died. 
Cancellation was most common in the 1680s, occurring in 24 percent of apprenticeships. For 
this period, the register reveals that in most cases the apprentice had quit – 18 percent were 
noted as ‘desistement’. In all three Dutch guilds at least one in three apprentices quit early. It 
is interesting to note that in these guilds – set within a stagnating economy - early exits 
became more frequent over the course of the eighteenth century; this is the opposite of the 
trend in Lyon, where exits declined as the industrial centre grew. 
 
<Insert Table 2 near here> 
 
Permanent exits were not the only reason apprentices might leave their masters. We 
can flesh this out in some detail in Lyon, where the guild registers are to our knowledge 
unique in systematically recording temporary pauses in apprenticeship. They indicate that ten 
to fifteen percent of apprentices would interrupt their contract (Table 3). Of that group, 
around a third in the 1740s and a quarter in the 1760s would later restart. Another third later 
cancelled their contracts (of whom a small number had restarted first). We do not know what 
happened to the final third of apprentices who interrupted – for all the guild’s official efforts, 
its records are incomplete. Perhaps they restarted without informing the guild. Perhaps they 
stayed away. 
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<Insert Table 3 near here> 
 
The third way in which apprentices left their master was by transferring their contract 
to another master. In Lyon in the 1680s, 27 percent of new apprentices had a transfer 
recorded beside their initial registration. By the 1740s and 1760s, the system had shifted, and 
transfers were now entered separately, supplying 12 to 15 percent of entries in the register. 
This coincided with a tightening of regulation: in the 1680s, it seems that the transfer had 
often been leading to the initial contract being registered retrospectively, making it difficult to 
estimate the actual share of transfers. The 1740s and 1760s suggest that fifteen percent would 
be a minimum estimate for transfers, however. Transfers were also common in the 
Netherlands and England. Eleven percent of Dutch apprentices transferred to a new master. 
Interestingly, moving did not affect the chance of completion: about 39 percent of those who 
transferred exited early, compared to 42 percent of the rest. Shrewsbury’s rates of transfer 
were similar: nine percent. Comparable rates occurred among apprentices from Leiden and 
Utrecht in the eighteenth century, London and Bristol in the 1690s, and Vienna in the 
nineteenth century.13  
Although the number of cancellations and transfers differs between each of these 
cities and guilds, early exits from apprenticeship were commonplace in all cases. If we take 
the perspective of the original master whom the apprentice joined at the start of their contract, 
then they would see one third to one half of their apprentices leaving prematurely: our cases 
give us a range between Lyon, where at least 34 percent of masters would lose their 
apprentice either by cancellation, death or transfer (18%+1%+15%), and the Netherlands, 
where 53 to 64 percent would depart (42%+11% to 53%+11%). Shrewsbury falls in between 
with 46 percent leaving. Looking from the apprentices’ side, the share who completed (some 
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with a different master) ranged between 46 and 80 percent: Shrewsbury and the Netherlands 
were at the low end and Lyon at the high.  
We could speculate about the differences in apprenticeship exits between the cities. 
They may be an artefact of our methods: we will be overestimating persistence in Lyon to the 
extent that the guild’s oversight was incomplete, and underestimating persistence in England 
and the Netherlands for those absent Shrewsbury apprentices who were still in contract or 
when the recording of leerbrief was patchy. Alternatively, Lyon’s strong guild and thriving 
silk industry may have motivated youths to stay, as seen among apprentices in growing trades 
today. Conversely, weak Dutch guilds and poor prospects offered less of an incentive. The 
main point is clear though. Even though the institutional and economic setting of 
apprenticeship markedly differed, in all three cases, apprentices and masters had much more 
flexibility to adjust agreements than a reading of regulations or contracts would suggest. The 
case of Lyon is particularly interesting in this respect, because the share of exits was clearly 
visible to the guild, but only led it to make transfers easier during the eighteenth century. 
What caused so many apprentices to exit, whether to change city or trade, abandon 
training, or find a new master? The sources that we use here contain little to answer this 
question. Other records, such as court petitions, memoirs, and the memoranda kept by 
orphanage overseers, do document reasons for exit – often crafted to convince a specific 
audience. In Lyon, for example, the fact that the consuls could fine masters or apprentices if 
they concluded that the exit was not for a legitimate cause heavily influenced testimony, just 
as in London’s Lord Mayors court the accusations in disputes over recovering premiums 
were trimmed to mimic the standard clauses of apprenticeship contracts.14  
Despite these problems of interpretation, it is clear that many terminations were 
consequences of the “delicate intertemporal exchange” involved in (necessarily incomplete) 
apprenticeship contracts. Apprentices agreed to work over an extended period in exchange 
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for board and training with little certainty about the quality of instruction or treatment at the 
outset. Some apprentices discovered too late that their master was violent, miserly, or 
insufficiently skilful. Some were unable to learn their trade, found it too harsh, or rejected the 
service and submission expected of them. Some discovered or inherited better opportunities 
elsewhere. Apprentices even ran away to sea.15  
Masters wrestled with similar problems: they expelled apprentices who stole, lied, 
disrupted workshops, assaulted mistresses, or wasted days or weeks in taverns. Some masters 
lacked sufficient work, fell bankrupt, or travelled. To give just one example, Suzanne 
Charezieu’s son successfully petitioned Lyon’s consuls to allow her son to transfer because 
his master’s workshop had been destroyed. Arguably, mismatches were more likely when the 
apprentice came from a different place or social group from their master. The social 
differentiation of exits thus allows us to indirectly discuss such reasons behind contract 
terminations – at least those that were decided by apprentices. But the strong similarities 
between the causes listed in early modern sources and those found in studies of present-day 
apprenticeship breakdowns underline the unavoidability of these problems – underpinned by 
information asymmetry, bounded foresight, the impact of unanticipated events - in training 
contracts of long duration.16  
 
EXITS BY INSIDERS AND OUTSIDERS 
 
Intuitively, we would expect that the willingness to exit would vary between apprentices 
because of their respective resources, as it does today. Apprenticeship supplied some of the 
necessities for economic survival. Yet young adults also took advantage of family wealth and 
local connections. This presumably affected the costs (and benefits) of departure. For 
instance, exiting might have been hard for youths with strong family ties in the city. Why 
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leave if it means you will not qualify to take over the family business? Flexibility in the 
enforcement of contracts did not imply the absence of social and institutional pressures for 
completion.  Together with the likelihood mentioned above that apprentices who knew the 
trade, city and master were less likely to make bad matches, this suggests a simple 
hypothesis: rates of departure should be lower among youths with relatively close 
connections to their master, locality and occupation (needless to say, it is easy to envisage 
other possible, complementary explanations based on age, wealth, economic shocks).17  
If we look at which apprentices left, this logic played out in Shrewsbury and The 
Netherlands. In Shrewsbury strong local ties are associated with persistence. Boys bound to 
their father stayed far more often than those bound to strangers (83 vs. 53 percent, p=0.008). 
Apprentices whose fathers were freemen of the Shrewsbury guild they entered (a group that 
overlaps substantially with those bound to their fathers) were much more likely to be present 
than those who were not (76 vs. 54 percent, p=0.063). Those whose fathers were burgesses of 
the city were also more likely to be present than the rest, although the difference is not 
significant at standard levels (67 vs. 53 percent, p=0.219). Note that the strength of the tie 
weakens with each step away from the guild. It is family ties to the institution that dominate, 
not geography. In fact, boys from outside Shrewsbury were more likely to remain with their 
master than local boys who did not have a freeman father (73 vs. 50 percent, p=0.064).18  
The effect of local origin and family ties can also be examined for two of the Dutch 
samples. Among Amsterdam butchers’ apprentices, local youths were much more likely to 
earn their leerbrief than foreigners (61 vs. 45 percent, p=0.006). However, family ties 
(indicated by a shared surname) were even more important: many more foreign apprentices 
finished if they were bound to a similarly-named master (75 vs. 36 percent, p= 0.000); among 
native Dutch apprentices, having family ties also strongly favoured completion (93 vs. 47 
percent, p=0.000). Among Leiden surgeons’ apprentices, completion rates rise as we move 
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from immigrants, to local non-citizens’ sons, and finally to master’s sons (44 vs. 60 vs. 82 
percent, p = 0.000). In both guilds, family ties were the strongest predictor of completion, 
with local connections adding a further reinforcement.19 
For Lyon, place of origin is the only characteristic that can be used to identify 
differences between apprentices, and then only in the eighteenth century; master’s sons were 
exempted from the obligation to serve an apprenticeship (in practice, they often served an 
informal apprenticeship, as affermés). When we compare the fortunes of apprentices from the 
city of Lyon with those from further afield, we find no meaningful difference. Migrants were 
marginally more likely to cancel their contracts than locals, but the difference was small (15.3 
vs. 11.8 percent, p=0.063) in the 1760s, and trivial (19.0 vs. 17.2 percent, p =0.103) in the 
1740s.20 
Aside from Lyon then, being a relative insider does appear to have reduced 
apprentices’ willingness to leave their contracts. This may reflect their better information or 
the stronger incentives (damage to reputation; loss of access to family assets) they faced. 
Probably, both these factors, and more, worked in parallel. Signs of the same rationale can be 
found in some contemporary accounts by artisans, and is apparent in patterns of return 
migration by apprentices. It could also explain why exits in Lyon were less differentiated by 
geographical origins, since the concentration of silk weaving in Lyon meant that quitting 
apprentices would find few opportunities elsewhere.21 
 
THE TIMING OF EXITS  
 
We can better appreciate the nature of apprentices’ movements if we look at when they left 
their masters. Today, most contract terminations (both transfers and quits) happen during the 
first year, because poor working conditions, difficulties between apprentice and master, or a 
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lack of interest in the occupation are generally recognized quickly. Terminations are more 
common for youths with worse prospects (immigrants, poor) who are selected into worse 
placements and whose information may be poorer. However, in the nineteenth century many 
commentators believed that exits mainly happened late in the term - the point when the 
master gains most from his now-trained apprentice’s presence - because apprentices were 
leaving to work as journeymen for other masters. In short, the timing of departure implies 
different types of causation and different patterns of agency: while early departures might be 
initiated by either master or apprentice, it is apprentices who are more likely to be choosing 
to exit late in the term. Of course, alongside these ‘intentional’ exits, apprenticeships also 
ended through the impact of mortality, morbidity and firms’ economic failure.22 
For Lyon and Shrewsbury, but not for the Netherlands, we are able to compute the 
timing of apprentices’ exits. For Shrewsbury this is measured by the share of apprentices still 
present in their master's household by year of contract; for Lyon this is measured by counting 
the months between the cancellation date and the date of the apprenticeship contract. The 
latter is obviously more precise, since absence does not necessarily imply contract 
termination, as we discussed earlier. Figure 1 groups the presence (Shrewsbury) and 
cancellation or transfers of contracts during apprentices’ terms (Lyon), to indicate when 
apprentices may have exited from their contracts. In both cases, the cohorts are synthetic, 
rather than reports of sequential observations for individuals.  
 
<Insert Figure 1 near here> 
 
In Lyon, most of the cancellations happened during the three first years of the contract 
in the 1740s, and the two first years in the 1760s, but exits continued throughout the term. 
There is no clear clustering of departures either at the start or end of the contract. This implies 
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a mix of motivations among apprentices and masters: from resolving a poor initial match to 
quitting after having learned enough.  
For Shrewsbury, the shape of the line in Figure 1 is similar to that observed in studies 
of London and Bristol: there is evidence of considerable rates of absence among apprentices; 
and the share who are present declines over time. Interpretation is complicated by the initial 
rise in the share of apprentices present: the peak (71 percent) comes in the third year of 
contracts; this probably reflects apprentices delaying the actual start of their contracts to 
shorten the long seven-year term. The share present then declines: only 37 percent are present 
in their sixth year. The surprising recovery in the final year to 54 percent is a pattern seen 
elsewhere in England, and is likely to reflect those apprentices with an eye to careers in 
Shrewsbury returning in order to publicly finish their training. The drop from peak to trough 
is large – almost 50 percent. If we take the last year as equivalent to the exit rate excluding 
temporary absentees, then the drop would be around a quarter. The true figure is likely to fall 
between these estimates, however, as the snapshot-like nature of the tax data does not allow 
us to observe the true ‘peak’ of presence. The speed of decline is somewhat slower than in 
London and Bristol, implying somewhat greater persistence. The clear impact of institutional 
forces that imposed lengthy fixed terms and rewarded ‘completion’ makes it difficult to infer 
causation from timing with any exactitude in Shrewsbury, but the substantial trough in the 
second half of the term surely suggests that a substantial share of exits were being made by 
youths who had achieved some skill. 23 
Across both locations, our results point to the existence of a mix of reasons behind 
apprentices’ decisions to leave (or their masters’ choice  to fire). Exits were not – so far as we 
can tell – heavily clustered at the start or end of training.  
 
FROM APPRENTICE TO MASTER 
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Historians have long recognised that the pathway from binding as an apprentice to taking the 
oath of a master was only one of many possible outcomes for youths entering urban labour 
markets. Perhaps the clearest signal of this is the substantial gap that usually existed between 
the numbers of new apprentices and the numbers of new masters in each guild (Figure 2). 
The similarities across Europe are striking. Low ratios of apprentices to masters are 
commonplace. Even in the craft of surgeons, with relatively high apprenticeship fees, no 
more than fifteen percent of Dutch apprentices eventually became masters. Of all the cities 
for which figures are available, it was only in the Paris masons’ guild that more than half of 
apprentices became masters. In all other cases, most apprentices were never likely to become 
a master – at least locally.24 
 
<Insert Figure 2 near here> 
 
In fact, guild structures defined three possible local outcomes for apprentices. The 
first was exiting during the apprenticeship. The second route was qualifying as journeymen, 
but not achieving mastership in the local guild and either remaining as a waged worker or 
migrating elsewhere. The third option was to become a master in the local guild. We have 
seen that considerable numbers of youths experienced the first outcome. What was the 
distribution across the other two outcomes? For the three Dutch guilds, lists of masters can be 
linked to apprentices to examine how dominant each of the first three routes might have been. 
Figure 3 shows the share of apprentices receiving lehrbrief, discussed above, alongside the 
share becoming master, for each group of Dutch apprentices. It is clear that a lot of 
apprentices who qualified as journeymen would remain so throughout their career. Across the 
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three guilds between 22 and 43 percent of apprentices qualified as journeymen but never 
became masters in their local guild.25 
 
<Insert Figure 3 near here> 
 
Local connections sharply improved the chances that a youth would become a master 
in the Netherlands. In the butchers’ and pastry bakers’ guilds, roughly half of those 
apprentices who possessed ties to local masters and who became journeymen would later 
become masters themselves, compared to only a quarter of those apprentices without local 
ties who became journeymen. The contrast was even starker among Leiden surgeons’ 
apprentices: 27 percent of apprentices with ties who became journeymen later became 
masters, but only 9 percent of journeymen without ties made that final step (p=0.001). (The 
lower rate of mastership among journeymen surgeons with ties appears to be because a 
relatively large share of sons of masters obtained their leerbrief in the first place.) Given that 
possessing ties already affected the chance of completing an apprenticeship, the cumulative 
effect that connections had on the chance of corporate success for these youths was dramatic. 
Just four to ten percent of non-local youths who started apprenticeships in these three guilds 
later became masters, compared to 20 to 30 percent of youths with kin ties. 
In Lyon, mastership could be obtained in several ways, making it harder to trace the 
route from apprentice to master. The main grounds were apprenticeship (36%), being a 
master’s son (38%), and marriage to a master’s daughter or widow (36%); some qualified 
under several headings. Another three percent (mostly foreigners) entered after working as a 
journeyman without having been apprenticed in Lyon. Few apprentices whose contracts were 
cancelled later emerged as master (just 5 of the 138 apprentices traced among masters). The 
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time it took for youths to become masters varied widely, rendering direct linkage with our 
sample of apprentices impossible at present.  
Nonetheless, we can estimate the share of apprentices in Lyon who became masters. 
Between 1769 and 1773 inclusive, 281 of 777 new masters qualified by apprenticeship and 
another 116 former apprentices qualified via another route, an average of 79 per year. 
Between 1763 and 1765, the latest years in which these former apprentices had started 
training, 1,126 new apprenticeships were registered, an average of 375 per year. If these rates 
are broadly representative, then around 21 percent (79/375) of youths who started as 
apprentices later became masters. Given that at least 18 percent of apprentices cancelled their 
contracts, this implies that up to 61 percent of those who started apprenticeships in silk 
weaving spent their lives as journeymen – either in Lyon or elsewhere – and that a minimum 
of 26 percent (21/82) of those who qualified as journeymen became masters.  
Did connections matter for mastership in Lyon as they did in the Netherlands? For 
Lyon we cannot directly calculate the odds of mastership for the sons of masters, but they 
must have been much higher than for migrant apprentices. If the odds were the same this 
would imply that at least 26 percent of master’s sons became masters. Yet given that sons 
supplied 38 percent of new masters, this would imply enormously high fertility among 
masters (if for simplicity, we assume the flow of masters is stable, then on average every 
master would need to produce 1.5 adult male children (38 x (100/26); in fact, as the number 
of masters was growing, the challenge was even greater). While our estimates are rougher 
than for the Netherlands, the results are similar: mastership was achieved by a minority of 
journeymen, and was much more likely to be attained by those with strong local connections. 
For Shrewsbury, the long term outcomes of apprentices are also difficult to estimate, 
thanks to patchy guild records and the unusual English practice of expecting journeymen to 
become guild freemen. Overall, 34 percent of apprentices later became freemen in the three 
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guilds for which we can link apprentices to mastership entries, with rates varying between 24 
percent in the Weavers’ and 45 percent in the Tailors’ guild. Put alongside our earlier 
estimate that around 54 percent of apprentices finished their contracts, this implies that about 
18 percent either remained as journeymen in the city without becoming freemen (this was not 
uncommon even when individuals did later become freemen) or migrated elsewhere - not far 
from the shares seen in Dutch guilds, but much lower than in Lyon.26  
There are signs that the bias towards insiders that affected persistence within 
apprenticeship in Shrewsbury played out in mastership too. Youths who trained with their 
father were more likely to become masters in the Mercers and Weavers’ guilds than others 
(63 vs 42 percent in the Mercers (p=0.057); 67 vs. 29 percent in the Weavers). Youths from 
Shrewsbury were also more likely to become masters (39 vs. 31 percent). These results are 
tentative though: only the first of these results meets standard levels of statistical significance, 
and among tailors’ apprentices fewer kin became masters. If we focus just on those 
apprentices who were in the final four years of their contracts at the point in 1695 when we 
can observe presence or absence (by taking the last four years we avoid those who have not 
yet arrived), it was those apprentices who remained with their master that had a real chance 
of becoming freemen. True, mastership remained a minority outcome, but the odds were far 
better for those we find living with their master than they were for youths who were missing 
(44 vs. 7 percent, p=0.095). 
Shrewsbury offers us one other useful, if crude, indicator of success: the share of 
apprentices who later became burgesses (citizens) in the city. The burgesses were a small, 
wealthy group, whose rights were primarily political rather than economic; they formed an 
urban elite. Apprenticeship was not a criterion for becoming a burgess (as it was for guild 
membership). Only a small minority - sixteen percent - of apprentices became burgesses. 
Among this group, those apprentices found with their masters were more than twice as likely 
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to become burgesses than those who were absent (21 vs. 9 percent, p=0.091). Absence 
seriously reduced the chance of succeeding on this (local) measure. Note, that the fluidity of 
apprenticeship contracts that we observe here is not a simple division between successful 
(present) and failed (absent) apprentices. Absence could also come about as apprentices 
found a better match, pursued an alternative career in Shrewsbury, worked elsewhere, or 
delayed starting work with their master.27 
Mastership was the exception not the rule for youths who began an apprenticeship and 
for those who finished one successfully. But it was a status that was more likely to be 
achieved by those with strong ties to the guild, particularly the sons of existing masters. 
Insiders experienced a smoother passage both as apprentices and journeymen – much as they 
do today.  
There are two obvious ways to explain this outcome: guilds might hinder the entry of 
journeymen who were not insiders; or sons might be at an advantage because they possessed 
prior knowledge and better local resources. Some guilds did fix the rules to advantage their 
own. Among those we discuss here, Lyon did not expect masters’ sons to serve an 
apprenticeship; in Shrewsbury, some masters’ sons also seem to have entered without a 
formal apprenticeship; in the Netherlands, sons paid lower registration fees.  
After youths had started their apprenticeship, however, there is no sign that outsiders 
were treated differently or systematically discouraged. In most Dutch guilds, outsiders paid 
the same mastership fee as members’ sons, as they did in Shrewsbury. No report survives of 
any apprentice who applied for freedom being rejected in Shrewsbury or the Dutch guilds. 
Such official silences can, obviously, conceal all kinds of exclusionary activities. Yet 
arguably, these guilds had little to gain from conspiring against qualified outsiders, and much 
to lose if any surreptitious moves to exclude those who were qualified for membership led to 
their privileges being challenged at law. The fact that insiders enjoyed better prospects at 
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each stage of their lives, from drawing up their apprenticeship contract to mastership, thus 
seems likely to reflect their home-field advantage, not biased refereeing by the guild.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Pre-modern cities set out a normative institutional framework for work that appears on the 
surface to define a highly segmented labour market. Subsequent commentators have often 
taken these norms as reflecting quotidian realities. Yet, as this and other recent studies have 
shown, the practice of apprenticeship was flexible not rigid in much of Europe. Youths and 
journeymen came and went, from place to place, master to master, and probably occupation 
to occupation. Exit rates among apprentices were substantial. Outsiders left more often than 
insiders. For those apprentices who did qualify as journeymen, the chance of becoming a 
master was low, and was conditioned by the same factors – local connections – that affected 
apprentices’ persistence. The distribution of ‘success’ in apprenticeship and mastership 
seems, from what we can see in these cases, to reflect the differences in the opportunities they 
encountered and the resources they possessed, as well as the risks they faced. Leaving an 
apprenticeship was not costless. But the penalties – reputational damage, uncertainty, the risk 
of lawsuits – were apparently more likely to be outweighed by the benefits for youths who 
were lacked close ties to the city and craft they were leaving. If this seems too optimistic an 
interpretation, it seems plausible that masters felt a greater freedom to eject the children of 
outsiders. There can be little doubt that both apprentices and masters drove the attrition of 
contracts that we observe in these cities.28 
Instability was an integral part of early modern apprenticeship and skilled labour 
markets. In the context of the high departure rates we observe here, it seems reasonable to 
assume that many new apprentices must have been well aware that they were unlikely to 
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attain the status of journeymen, let alone master. Masters too must have recognized that many 
apprentices would not finish their contracts, and their own interests drove them to eject a 
proportion of their trainees themselves. None of the guilds involved attempted to enforce the 
completion of apprenticeship contracts, whether with an eye to bolstering training or backing 
up exploitative masters. Instead, they coexisted comfortably with this situation. The most 
bureaucratic, such as Lyon and London, even set up systems to process exits. While 
mastership has few exact modern parallels, the chances of finishing an apprenticeship, and 
the inequalities in opportunity between those with local connections and outsiders, strongly 
echo many studies of apprenticeship in the early twenty-first century.29 
If the parallels between modern and early modern apprenticeship are stronger than is 
often recognised, to understand why apprenticeship might benefit from this flexibility it is 
useful to drawn another modern parallel: today’s universities, where drop-out rates are often 
substantial, yet institutions fail to deter exits. The comparison highlights the two sides of 
flexibility: on the one hand, dropping out can signal poor-quality provision; on the other 
hand, dropping out allows students to escape from bad matches to courses and careers. As for 
apprenticeship, all exits are not failures. Nor are they distributed randomly across social 
groups. Restricting drop-outs could lead to poorer outcomes for some individuals. In 
particular, increasing penalties for exit could deter potential entrants or lock individuals into 
bad choices. Turning back to pre-modern cities, a similar logic may hold, especially where 
guilds and cities had to attract migrant labour from outside their communities if they were to 
sustain their workforces.30 
Indeed, the strength of apprenticeship as an institution that survived throughout the 
centuries may be explained not by the rigidity of the guild system, but rather by its flexibility 
in allowing actors to use it in diverse ways. We cannot measure these costs and benefits 
directly in the past, but two aspects of this system – the long survival of these local regimes, 
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and the connection drawn in recent work between flexible training systems and economic 
growth in the past – suggest that the wider moral to be drawn would be that, for 
apprenticeship, ‘failure’ had its own value.31 
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Table 1. Overview of apprenticeship samples. 
 
City Guild Period Apprentices 
Shrewsbury Glovers 1688-1695 28 
 Mercer 1688-1695 31 
 Smiths 1688-1695 41 
 Tailors 1688-1695 59 
 Weavers 1688-1695 17 
Lyon Grande fabrique 1680s 1,041 
  1740s 2,505 
  1760s 1,735 
Leiden Surgeons 1683-1729 394 
Amsterdam Pastry bakers 1748-1776 643 
 Pig butchers 1787-1811 517 
Total   7,011 
 
Sources: Shrewsbury: Shropshire Archives MS6001/126; 6001/4263; 6001/5837; 6001/3360; 6001/4583. Lyon: 
Municipal Archives, HH 597; HH601; HH602; Netherlands: Stadsarchief Amsterdam, Archief Gilden, inv. 591; 
inv. 1470; Regionaal Archief Leiden, Archief Gilden, inv. 351. 
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Note
s: 
For 
Shrewsbury we report the share present in the final year of their term and we are unable to discriminate between 
transfer and cancellation. For Lyon, we report the share of apprentices whose contracts ended by cancellation 
(the sample is restricted to new apprentice registrations). For the Netherlands, we report the share of apprentices 
who did not receive a leerbrief. The pig butchers guild includes 173 apprentices with no recorded outcome; we 
report the range between a minimum (apprentices with known outcomes) and maximum (that assumes 
apprentices with no outcome did not receive their leerbrief).  
 
  
Location Guild Period Exits 
(%) 
N 
Shrewsbury Combined c.1690 46.21 126 
     
Lyon Silk Weavers c.1680 24.3 955 
  c.1740 17.5 2,123 
  c.1760 13.9 1,526 
  Total 17.7 4,604 
Leiden Surgeons 1683-1729 40 394 
Amsterdam Pastry bakers 1748-1776 50 643 
 Pig butchers 1787-1811 34-68 517 
  Total 42-53 1,554 
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Table 3. Interruptions of contracts in Lyon. 
 I II III IV V  
Period Interrupt Then 
restart 
Then 
cancel 
Cancel after 
restart 
Unknown Total 
 (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) N 
1740s 11.4 3.8 3.9 0.5 4.2 2,136 
1760s 15.9 3.6 7.49 0.3 5.11 1,533 
All 13.2 3.8 5.4 0.4 4.4  
Total 489 138 199 16 168 3,669 
 
Notes: the table reports the percentage of apprentices registered as interrupting contract, restarting after an 
interruption, and cancelling contract after interrupting. Column IV reports the share cancelling after restarting 
and these individuals are also counted in column III (Cancel). Column 5 reports the share unknown, i.e. V=I-II-
(III-IV). Sample restricted to new apprentice registrations. 
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Figure 1. The share of apprentices remaining with their first master, Lyon & Shrewsbury. 
 
Notes: For Lyon the figure shows the share surviving of a synthetic cohort of apprentices experiencing the rate 
of transfer and cancellation observed in each period. No attempt is made to account for the effect of 
interruptions. For Shrewsbury, the share present in year t represents a cluster of apprentices observed in 1695 at 
t years after starting their contract. Each year thus represents a different group of individual apprentices. 
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Figure 2. Share of apprentices becoming master in their guild of training. 
 
Notes: When figures were available for more than one guild per city we have given the average share. The 
figure for Vienna refers to apprentices completing their contracts. 
Sources: see Appendix. 
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Figure 3. Careers of Dutch apprentices within their guild of training. 
 
Notes: Journeyman status is equated with apprentices obtaining their leerbrief. 
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Appendix 
 
Share of apprentices becoming master within their guild of training. 
 
City Guild percent Period 
Amsterdam Pig butchers 11 1787-1811 
Antwerp Cabinet makers 11 1691-1760 
Antwerp Carpenters 14 1701-1790 
Antwerp Shoemakers 17 1766-1793 
Antwerp Gold and silversmiths 21 1577-1763 
Antwerp Tinsmiths and plumbers 30 1711-1790 
Antwerp Tanners 33 1678-1785 
Barcelona Book sellers 28 1760-1788 
Barcelona Silk weavers 50 1782-1834 
Bristol All 32 1560-1680 
Chester Leather crafts 50 1558-1625 
Leiden Surgeons 15 1683-1729 
London Masons, carpenters, stationers, cordwainers, 
drapers 
41 1633-1660 
Lyon Silk weavers 21 1769-1771 
Madrid Passementiers, carpenters, tailors 11 1720-1780 
Norwich All 17 1510-1700 
Paris Masons 70 18th c. 
Rhine Region Coopers and blacksmiths 51 1529-1615 
Sheffield Cutlers 47 1624-1814 
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Utrecht Surgeons 9 1740-1799 
Utrecht Coopers 22 1588-1662 
Vienna Locksmiths 43 1785-1803 
Vienna Leather workers 61 1709-1854 
Vienna Pearl embroiderers 68 1665-1865 
Vienna Book binders 80 1750-1804 
Württemberg Worsted weaving 10 1616-1626 
Württemberg Worsted weaving 26 1750-1760 
 
Note: The figure for Vienna refers to apprentices completing their contracts. 
Sources: Ben-Amos, “Failure to Become Freemen,” 157; De Munck, Technologies of Learning, 161-167; 
Victoria López Barahona and José Antolín Nieto Sánchez, “Artisan Apprenticeship in Early Modern Madrid 
(1561-1800),”  Paper presented at the workshop “Apprenticeship in Early Modern Europe”, Utrecht (2016), 16; 
Sheilagh Ogilvie, State Corporatism and Proto-Industry: The Württemberg Black Forest, 1580-1797 
(Cambridge, 1997), 149; Ruben Schalk, “Apprenticeships and Craft Guilds in the Netherlands, 1600–1900,” 
CGEH Working Paper Series, 80 (2016), 18-19; Àngels Solà Parera, ‘Craft Apprenticeship in Barcelona, 1760-
1850,” Paper presented at the workshop “Apprenticeship in Early Modern Europe”, Utrecht (2016), 10-12; 
Sonenscher, Work and Wages, 109-110; Wallis, “Apprenticeship and Training,” 839; Patrick Wallis, “Research 
memo Lyon apprentice - master linkage”; Kurt Wesoly, Lehrlinge und Handwerksgesellen am Mittelrhein: Ihre 
Soziale Lage und Ihre Organisation vom 14. bis ins 17. Jahrhundert (Frankfurt am Main, 1985), 90; Annemarie 
Steidl, Auf nach Wien!: die Mobilität des Mitteleuropäischen Handwerks im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert am 
Beispiel der Haupt- und Residenzstadt (Vienna, 2003), 253. 
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